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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. 
FERMIN MIERA, JR. Case No. 18357 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Fermin Miera,.appeals from a conviction and 
judgment of Burglary, a Felony of the Third Degree in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant, Fermin Miera, was charged with Burglary, 
a Felony of the Third Degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-202(1) (1953 as amended). He was convicted of the charge 
in a jury trial and was subsequently sentenced to incarceration 
at the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of 0-5 
years. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the conviction and judgment 
rendered below and asks to have the judgment vacated and a 
judgment of acquittal entered or to have the case remanded 
to the Third Judicial District Court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On New Year's Eve, December 31, 1981, at about 1:53 
a.m., a police officer saw broken windows on a downtown office 
building and observed Appellant inside. (T. 6) Shortly thereafter, 
an alarm sounded from the building and two more officers arrived 
at the scene. (T. 11,27) Appellant was found alone inside 
the building with a roll of stamps and a pen and pencil set 
in his pockets. (T. 16) Three large rocks were found inside 
the building in the office adjacent to the broken window. (T. 
19) The stamps and pen and pencil were believed to have been 
removed by Appellant from one of the offices in the building 
(T. 18). These stamps were returned to the owner of the building 
(T. 25). 
Prior to being found inside the building, Appellant 
had consumed about 13 cans of beer, two bottles of wine and 
had sniffed toluene throughout the course of the evening. (T. 
60-62) Appellant testified that he was aware he entered the 
building, but did not know why he entered (T. 64). He was heading 
home (T. 63) and it was cold outside (T. 69). He had no intention 
-2-
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of taking anything from the building (T. 65). The officers 
testified to Appellant's cooperative behavior and appropriate 
responses to questions during the twenty minutes they were 
with him in the building. (T. 23,32,33,48,53). 
Dr. Brian S. Finkle, Director of the Center for Human 
Toxicology at the University of Utah, testified that the consumption 
of the beer and wine caused Appellant to have a blood alcohol 
of .17% (T. 89). He further testified that toluene, a paint 
thinner, along with the alcohol would add to the effects of 
the alcohol (T. 91). In Dr. Finkle's opinion, Appellant would 
have been "seriously intoxicated". (T. 89) His eyesight, 
ability to focus, judgment, short-term memory, motor coordination, 
reaction time and manual dexterity would be "measurably impaired". 
(T. 91) At the same time, a person who develops a tolerance 
for alcohol or solvents may not exhibit signs of impairment 
and yet be under their influence. (T. 90,93) 
Appellant was convicted after a jury trial of Burglary, 
a third degree felony, punishable for the indeterminate term 
of 0-5 years at the Utah State Prison. 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO GIVE 
APPELLANT'S JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(4) (1953 as amended) provides: 
The court shall not be obligated to 
charge the jury with respect to an included 
offense unless there is a rational basis 
for a verdict acquitting the defendant 
of the offense charged and convicting 
him of the included offense. 
There was a rational basis for a conviction of criminal trespass 
in this case and the jury should have been instructed on the 
lesser included offense of criminal trespass. This Court recently 
set forth an analysis of whether an offense is a lesser included 
crime. In State v. Hill, Case No. 18180 (November 1, 1983), 
this Court outlined a principal test involving the statutory 
language and a secondary test involving the evidence in the 
specific case. This analysis was essentially followed in an 
earlier Utah case involving a request for a criminal trespass 
instruction in a burglary case. In State v. Baker, Case No. 
18245 (September 21, 1983), this Court found that the evidence 
in that ·case was insufficient to have required the trial court 
to have instructed on a lesser included. 
Unlike the Baker, case, each of the tests is met in 
this case. First, all of the pertinent elements of criminal 
t~espass are part of the statutory definition of burglary. 
Secondly, the circumstances of this case compel a conclusion 
·that criminal trespass was a lesser included of the burglary 
charge. 
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A 
CRIMINAL TRESPASS IS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE 
OF BURGLARY BY THE TERMS OF THE STATUTES. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-l-402(3)(a) (1953 as amended) provides 
that an offense is a lesser included offense when "[i]t is 
established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged." 
Utah's statutory scheme requires the court to compare the elements 
of the offense. If the greater offense necessarily involves 
committing the lesser offense, then the lesser is an included 
offense. 
The statutes setting out the crimes of burglary and 
criminal trespass are as follows: 
Burglary. -- (1) A person is guilty 
of burglary if he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building or any portion 
of a building with intent to commit 
a felony or theft or commit an assault 
on any person. [Utah Code Ann. §76-
6-202 (1) (1953 as amended)] 
Criminal trespass. -- (1) For purposes 
of this section "enter" means intrusion 
of the entire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal 
trespass if, under circumstances not 
amounting to burglary as defined in 
sections 76-6-202, 76~6-203, or 76-
6-204: 
(a) He enters or remains unlawfully 
on property and; 
(i) Intends to cause annoyance 
or injury to any person thereon or damage 
to any property thereon; or 
-5-
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(ii) Intends to connnit any crime, 
other than theft or a felony; 
(iii) Is reckless as to whether 
his presence will cause fear for the 
safety of another. [Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-205(1) and (2) (1953 as amended)]. 
The criminal trespass statute is intended to be a lesser 
included offense of burglary. The legislature even specified 
that criminal trespass occurs "under circumstances not amounting 
to burglary." Although the criminal trespass statute sets 
forth intentions other than the "intent to commit a felony 
or theft or assault" in the burglary statute, an intent to 
cause annoyance or to damage property [Utah Code Ann. §76-
6-206 (2) (a) (i)] or being reckless as to the fear caused by 
the actor's presence [Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206(a)(iii)] are 
of necessity included within the intent required under the 
burglary statute. One cannot intend to commit a felony, a 
theft, or an assault without either intending annoyance or 
damage or being reckless as to the reactions to his presence. 
There is thus considerable overlap of the statutory elements 
of the two crimes. 
B 
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL SUPPORTED A LESSER INCLUDED 
INSTRUCTION ON CRIMINAL TRESPASS. 
In State v. Baker, supra, this Court recognized that 
an instruction on a lesser included offense is appropriate 
"if the evidence offered provides a 'rational basis for a verdict 
-6-
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acquitting the appellant of the offense charged and convicting 
him of the included offense."' Id. at 10. Such a rational 
basis existed in this case. As here, the defendant in Baker 
was charged with burglary. Police found him inside a gas station. 
A lock had been broken off a desk drawer and the contents of 
the desk were scattered. Nothing was found missing. The defendant 
asserted that he was too intoxicated to form an intent to commit 
a theft. In affirming the lower court's refusal to give a 
lesser included instruction, this Court held that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the defendant's claim of intoxication 
to a point of inability to form an intent. This Court further 
held that, even if the defendant could not form an intent, 
it was proper to refuse a criminal trespass instruction where 
intent is also required for the commission of that offense. 
Id. at 11. 
In this case, Appellant presented considerable testi~ony 
negating his capacity to form the intent to connnit any crime 
while inside the building. Appellant testified to his long 
history of glue sniffing and alcohol consumption. At the time 
of the offense, he had been sniffing solvents for almost 20 
years. On the evening of the event in question, he had sniffed 
toluene, a paint thinner, and he had consumed more than a dozen 
cans of beer and two bottles of wine. (T. 60-62). He testified 
that he was aware that he was in a building only because police 
officers pursued him and that he did not know why he had entered 
the building. (T. 64) He stated that he did not know if he 
took anything from the building and denied having intentions 
to remove anything (T. 65). His recollection of the event 
-~ 
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was vague as to how he got into the building .. (T. 67-68) 
Dr. Finkle testified to the influence of the alcohol 
and toluene on Appellant. Dr. Finkle estimated that Appellant's 
blood alcohol was about .17% at the time of the event. (T. 
89) The statutory presumption for for "under the influence" 
requires a blood alcohol of less than half Appellant's (.08%). 
Dr. Finkle described appellant's mental state as "drunk" or 
"seriously" intoKicated". (T. 89) Dr. Finkle testified to 
the effect of toluene enhancing Appellant's already intoxicated 
mental state (T. 91). Evidence of Appellant's extensive consumption 
of alcohol and toluene supports the theory that he would have 
been unable to form an intent as required by the burglary statute. 
The evidence of intoxication is greater in this case than was 
the evidence presented in Baker, supra. It is still necessary, 
of course, to show that criminal trespass was an appropriate 
lesser included offense. 
Appellant's conduct was reckless as to whether another 
person would have been in fear for his or her safety. Although 
Appellant was unable to form a specific intent, he could act 
recklessly. While no one was in the business when Appellant 
entered, he nevertheless acted with an awareness but disregard 
of the risks to any potential persons inside the building. 
Moreover, intoxication is no defense to a mental state of recklessness. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-306 (1953 as amended). Thus, Appellant's 
-8-
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theory of his defense, that any intent was negated by his intoxication, 
still supports a conviction of criminal trespass pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202(2)(a)(iii). There would have been 
a rational basis on which a jury could have returned a verdict 
of guilty of the lesser irlcluded offense. 
that: 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY THAT THE PROSECUTION MUST NEGATE THE 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-306 (1953 as amended) provides 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be 
a defense to a criminal charge unless 
such intoxication negates the existence 
of the mental state which is an element 
of the offense. . . 
The trial court's instruction to the jury in this case defining 
the defense essentially stated the statute. The court refused, 
however, to include the negation of this affirmative defense 
as an element that the State must prove. Appellant's proposed 
instruction was rejected and the Court's Instruction No. 13 
was given. 
This Court specifically addressed the issue of the prosecution's 
burden of proof when an affirmative defense is raised in State 
v.Torres, 619 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980). In Torres, this Court 
reversed a conviction where the trial court failed to give 
an appropriate instruction defining the burden of proof on a 
defendant's affirmative defense of self-defense. Although 
-9-
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the State argued that the instructions as a whole informed 
the jury of the proper burden, this Court stated that "[i]t 
seems neither fair nor necessary to expect or require the jury 
to go through such a tortuous process when that result could 
have been achieved by giving the defendant's requested instruction, 
or one of that substance." Id. at 696. 
Although the trial court instructed the jury on the 
burden of proof of defendant in raising an affirmative defense, 
the failure'. ·to instruct the jury on the State~ s burden ·'when 
listing the elements that must be proved could easily have 
misled the jury. As in Torres, supra, the jury should not 
have had to go through a "tortuous" process to define the burden 
on the State. The jury, presented with specific information 
in Instruction No. 12 regarding intoxication,'.may well have 
been confused by the trial court's failure to include a negation 
of voluntary intoxication in Instruction No. 13. They might 
not have known how to apply the information on intoxication 
to the chargeq offense of burglary. Had they been given the 
requested instruction, they could have applied their findings 
regarding intoxication to the element of intent to commit a 
theft and would have been guided more specifically as to 
when intoxication negated one of the necessary elements of 
burglary. 
-10-
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CONCLUSION 
Failure of the trial court to grant Appellant's requested 
instruction on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass 
and instruction on the negation of the affirmative defense 
of voluntary intoxication deprived Appellant of a fair trial. 
For all of the reasons cited above, we urge this Court to reverse 
the conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
DATED this~ day of November, 1983. 
INDA E. CARTER 
Attorney for Appellant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing.to the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
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